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Abstract 
This paper estimates the effects of revenue-neutral tax structure changes on the long-run level 
of income per capita using panel data for 30 EU countries (+ Norway and Switzerland) over 
the period 1995-2016. While no tax “ranking” can be established using full data sample, in 
terms of their effect on economic growth, slightly different “ranking” can be established 
when model is applied to smaller data samples, divided between “new” and “old” EU 
countries. As oppose to previous studies, we found that for both “new” and “old” countries 
most “distortive” are private income taxes and social security contributions. Property taxes 
are associated with higher level of income per capita in the long-run only in “old” EU 
countries. Corporate income taxes correspond to positive long-run effect on income per 
capita in “old” EU countries, while in “new” EU countries these effects are not robust. 
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1. Introduction 
Creation of country specific optimal tax structure has always been a major goal for 
every country at all times. This question becomes especially essential, after larger economic 
crises (eg. after 2008 Global economic crisis) or during periods of slow economic growth. 
Although, taxes in general are considered distortive in their effect on economic performance, 
during mentioned periods “shifts” towards least distortive taxes can help “boost” economic 
developments both in short and long run. 
When countries consider tax system reforms, be that after crisis or during slow 
economic growth periods, or when simply looking at revenue increase from specific tax, it is 
always useful to identify effects of tax instruments on growth. It is worth mentioning, that 
negative effect on growth from certain tax instrument does not imply that government should 
restrain from changes in this instrument. It all comes down to what government wants to tax 
and what do they want to accomplish by altering specific tax instrument. Thus tax instrument 
not only serves as an income source for government but can help accomplish different 
government targets. Optimal tax instrument has to accomplish several tasks. There are four 
basic “cornerstones” which optimal tax instrument should follow and find optimal balance 
between: efficiency, equity, simplicity and optimal tax revenue. Thus not only general tax 
level, but combination between fairness in tax redistribution, simplicity in tax administration 
and efficiency in discouraging tax evasion and avoidance affects governments decisions 
about tax instrument changes. Based on that households decide whether to save or to take 
part in labor market, or to invest, similarly, firms decide whether to produce, thus creating 
demand for labor, or to invest in research and development, or to save.  Thus tax instrument 
serves as a government tool to control for all these effects. While it is impossible to observe 
all these effects, we can look at more specific case where government is considering tax 
structure changes in order to increase economic growth while maintaining same level of tax 
revenue for public goods and services. Thus aim of this paper is to observe what are certain 
tax structure effects on economic growth. 
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One of the most widely discussed issues remains on premise that direct taxes are more 
distortionary than indirect taxes1. While this topic is researched extensively, both 
theoretically and empirically, conclusions over one’s superiority over other remains 
inconclusive. 
While there is wide body of theoretical and empirical literature on fiscal policy and 
tax levels, only small number of these concentrate on empirical research on tax structure 
effects on long-run growth in revenue-neutral tax system. Early studies by Kneller, Bleaney 
and Gemmell (1999), and later Widmalm (2001) use five-year average aggregate data to 
separate between short business cycles and long-run effects and apply traditional econometric 
tools (Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) regressions). Later they 
found that five-year averaging does not fully separate short-run effects and, as previously 
used regression models restrict coefficients to be equal across groups, that could lead to 
estimator bias. 
Later, to avoid this issue, Arnold et al. (2011) uses Pooled Mean Group (PMG)2 
estimator to observe tax structure effects on growth in “revenue-neutral”3 system. PMG 
estimator constraints the long-run coefficients to be identical but allows the short run 
coefficients and error variances to differ across countries. Using different tax structure 
revenue shares of GDP, Arnold et al. (2011) shows that increase in the revenue share of 
income taxes while decreasing the revenue share of consumption taxes, corresponds to 
negative effect on long-run income per capita. Furthermore, Arnold et al. (2011) establishes 
certain tax “distortion” ranking in terms of their effect on long-run income per capita. 
Ranking shows that least “distortive” taxes are property, followed by consumption, personal 
income and corporate income. More specifically, that recurrent taxes on immovable property 
are associated with highest positive impact on GDP per capita. Additionally, Arnold et al. 
                                                 
1 Henderson (1948); Little (1951); Corlett and Hague (1953); Atkinson (1976); Chamley (1986); Judd (1985); 
Bankman (1991); Cunningham (1996); Auerbach (2006). 
2 Developed by Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1999) 
3 Revenue-neutral tax structure issue was addressed by Bleaney, Michael F., Norman Gemmell and Richard 
Kneller. 2001. And is further discussed in Section 3. 
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(2011) shows that ranking remains robust when model is expressed with additional policy 
variables. 
This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying effects between tax 
structure and economic growth using cross-country panel data on 30 EU countries (EU28 + 
Norway and Switzerland) over the period 1995-2016. Additionally, author studies tax 
structure effects between “new” and “old” EU member states and compares them with 
benchmark results from full data sample and with the results from Arnold et al. (2011). Using 
PMG estimator on all 30 countries, author cannot establish similar tax “distortion” ranking 
achieved by Arnold et al. (2011). But certain ranking can be established when benchmark 
model is used with smaller data samples on “new” and “old” EU member states. Moreover, 
author shows that these results are robust when additional control variables are added to the 
model. Author also shows that estimates are consistent and efficient when test on validity of 
homogeneity restriction on long-run coefficients is performed. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides literature review on 
existing theories and empirical studies. Section 3 provides overview of applied methods and 
models. Section 4 briefly describes the data. Section 5 reports benchmark and alternative tax 
structure combination results of PMG estimator and compare them with Arnold et al. (2011) 
estimated results. In Section 6, author tests robustness of benchmark model when it is applied 
to smaller sample, divided between new (Section 6.1) and old (Section 6.2) EU member 
states. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 test robustness of newly estimated models by adding additional 
control variables. Section 7 tests validity of identical constraints in the long-run coefficients 
by using Hausman test. Section 8 provides conclusions. 
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2. Literature review 
There is a wide amount of literature on tax level effect on economic growth, but 
literature amount of tax structure effects as a whole on economic growth in revenue-neutral 
system is limited.  Thus Arnold et al. (2011)4 study about tax structure effects on income 
growth, being one of the most prominent, lead to further fiscal policy recommendations by 
OECD. But before that, it is necessary to acknowledge earlier studies in this field to better 
understand the development of research topic through other authors work.  
Early empirical studies 
Majority of early empirical studies on fiscal policy effects on growth concentrates on 
neoclassical growth models using tax income/GDP and government spending/GDP ratios as 
their main variables (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; and Folster and Henrekson, 2001) and 
(Kormendi and Meguire, 1985; Grier and Tullock, 1987; and Barro, 1989; 1990; 1991). 
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) tested impact of fiscal policy on growth through tax 
structure, tax level and government expenditure. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999), and 
later Widmalm (2001) use five-year average aggregate data to avoid short-run effects, 
arguing that this allows to distinguish steady state variables from policy variables on the 
transition.  Authors use pooled OLS and fixed-effects models on panel data set for 22 OECD 
countries over the period 1970–95. In their study, authors choose initial level of GDP per 
capita, investment/GDP ratio, labor force growth rate and “distortionary” and “non-
distortionary” tax to GDP ratios5 to estimate five-year average annual growth rate of real 
GDP per capita. Results suggested that increase of “distortionary” tax levels decreases 
income per capita and are consistent with Barro (1990) model. While authors state that their 
models are robust with various changes in specification, they also state that estimated effect 
magnitudes are sensitive to the five-year averaged dataset. They show that even lowest 
estimates, when increasing productive expenditure or decreasing “distortionary” taxes by 1% 
of GDP, increase growth rate by 0.2% per year (Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999). 
                                                 
4 Earlier studies of Arnold et al. (2011) include Arnold (2007 & 2008) and Johansson et al. (2008) 
5 Distortionary taxes are defined as taxes on income and profit, payroll and manpower, property, and social 
security contributions. Non-distortionary taxes are defined as those imposed on domestic goods and services. 
Both are expressed as percentages of total GDP. 
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Bleaney et al. (2001), in their later study, found that five-year averaging on dataset does not 
fully seperate short-run effects, thus estimated results should not be used to interpret long-
run growth effects.  
Widmalm (2001) uses similar dataset over period of 1965-1990 but estimates effects 
on growth while tax structure changes are revenue-neutral. Widmalm (2001), in his study, 
additionally includes export/GDP ratio and the variability of the inflation rate. Widmalm 
(2001) also includes total tax revenue/GDP ratio, measure of progressivity6 and choses 
different tax/total tax revenue classification ratios7. Widmalm (2001) uses Extreme Bounds 
Analysis (Leamer, 1983) and estimates robust negative effects of labor and capital tax 
revenue/total tax revenue ratio on GDP per capita growth rate. He also finds that corporate 
income revenue/total tax revenue ratio has fragile8 positive effect on income growth. 
Estimated results are also fragile for other tax revenue/total tax revenue ratios: payrolls and 
social security contributions, property tax, goods and services. 
Recent empirical studies 
Recent empirical studies started to address issue of homogeneity across countries in 
panel datasets. Equilibrium long-run growth paths may be similar within countries, while 
short-run effects may vary (Xing, 2011). For models where short-run dynamics and long-run 
effects are clearly determined this observation would imply biased estimators leading to 
invalid conclusions thus making pooled OLS and fixed-effects model not the best option for 
particular studies.  
To avoid possible estimator bias Gemmell et al. (2007) and Arnold et al. (2011) use 
Mean Group (MG) or Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, which constraints the long-run 
coefficients to be identical but allows the short run coefficients and error variances to differ 
across groups (Shin, Smith and Pesaran, 1998). 
                                                 
6 Widmalm (2001) measures tax progressivity by estimating the elasticity of total tax revenue /GDP ratio. 
7 Widmalm (2001) uses five additional specific tax revenue/total tax revenue ratios: corporate income, labor 
and capital income, property, goods and services, payroll and social security contributions. 
8 When using Extreme Bounds Analysis: “fragile” is vice versa of “robust”. 
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Gemmel, Kneller and Sanz (2007) compares robustness of long-run effects of fiscal 
policy on growth between MG and PMG versus previous – dynamic fixed-effects(DFE) 
model used by Bleaney et al. (2001). Bleaney et al. (2001) estimated positive long-run growth 
effects on productive public expenditures and budget surpluses and negative effects on 
distortionary taxes. Gemmel, Kneller and Sanz (2007) use OECD panel dataset from 1970-
2004 for 17 countries. Major disadvantage of MG and PMG estimators is degrees of freedom 
if available time series is short, thus certain restrictions on lag lengths are vital. Gemmel, 
Kneller and Sanz (2007) compare PMG and DFE with same length lags(2). While both 
models show similar parameter sizes, standard errors for PMG are higher. Both models 
identify long-run parameters less precisely, when compared with DFE with 8 lags. 
Arnold et al. (2011) uses same period OECD dataset as Gemmel, Kneller and Sanz 
(2007) but with 21 countries. He examines revenue-neutral tax structure changes on long-run 
level of GDP per capita. Similarly as Widmalm (2001), Arnold et al. (2011) categorizes taxes 
in groups as a ratio between group tax revenue/total tax revenue9. Arnold et al. (2011) PMG 
estimation results suggest certain ranking between four major tax groups on their long-run 
effects on GDP per capita. Ranking shows that least “distortive” taxes are property, followed 
by consumption, personal income and corporate income (i.e. increase in property taxes will 
have less negative effect on GDP per capita than increase in corporate income taxes). 
Additionally, ranking remains robust when model is expressed with additional policy 
variables – inflation, trade openness and expenditures on research and development (Arnold 
et al., 2011).  
Later Xing (2012) conducted similar empirical study, comparing PMG and MG 
estimates with simple OLS and Fixed Effects model results. While estimated coefficients 
varied between models in their signs, significance levels and magnitudes due to different 
model specification, by conducting Hausman test, Xing (2012) showed that PMG estimates 
are consistent and efficient regards other models. At the same time, increasing data sample 
with additional countries causes changes in tax structure variable significance levels. Thus 
                                                 
9 Arnold et al. (2011) categorizes taxes in four major groups: personal income, corporate income, consumption 
and property. 
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her results could not establish similar ranking as Arnold et al. (2011), as there were no 
significant differences between private and capital income taxes on their impact on economic 
growth. Similarly, there were no differences between recurrent property and other property 
taxes. Only significant result was that property taxes has a positive effect on long-term per 
capita growth. 
Empirical studies focusing on tax rates 
It is also necessary to acknowledge empirical studies where authors estimate different 
tax level effect on growth.  
Lee and Gordon (2005), using cross-country data to determine tax policies effect on 
countries growth rate, showed that decrease in corporate tax rate by 10 percentage points 
returns positive (1-2%) annual growth rate.  
Vermeend et al. 2008 found that capital income taxes can affect the rate of capital 
accumulation. Increase in capital income taxes could discourage investments and savings by 
firms and households. Decrease in investments lower capital stock, which further distorts 
economic growth over time.  
Karras and Furceri (2009), using annual panel data for 19 European economies, 
explored that increase in total tax rate to GDP by 1% in long term decreases GDP per capita 
by 0.5 – 1%. 
Prammer (2011) indicated that taxes on labor can affect growth relevant decisions by 
altering: the allocation of time between labor and leisure; human capital accumulation; 
occupational and entrepreneurial behavior and choices. 
Summary 
Early empirical studies concentrate on estimating tax structure effect on long-run 
level of growth of GDP by using aggregate averages to distinguish steady state variables from 
policy variables on the transition. In later studies, issue of all parameter restriction across 
countries, except for growth equation, were addressed. This restriction would create biased 
estimates and fragile conclusions if short-run effects would indeed vary across countries 
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while converging to steady state.  Gemmell et al. (2007) and Arnold et al. (2011) in their 
studies relax this restriction by using estimators which fix long-run coefficients while 
allowing short-run coefficients to vary across groups. Thus allowing for Arnold et al. (2011) 
to establish certain ranking on tax “distortion” towards growth.  Xing (2012) in later studies 
tests robustness of empirical results of Arnold et al. (2011) and shows that tax ranking is not 
consistent when increasing data sample with additional countries. 
Although there is wide body of literature on tax structure effect on economic growth, 
empirical evidence is inconclusive and present certain empirical research gaps. Firstly - 
“aged” empirical results. Most of the empirical research has been done on relatively old 
datasets. Secondly – empirical research only on OECD countries. Most of the studies on EU 
research tax level, not tax structure, effect on economic growth.10 Thirdly – are estimated 
results consistent between countries with different economic conditions?11 Thus author, 
further in paper, will address all three points by using new dataset on EU countries while 
addressing possible tax structure effect differences between countries with different 
economic conditions. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
10 Similar research on EU countries is more logical from simple geographical stand point. Labour mobility is 
“easier” and much more plausible between EU countries than it is for OECD countries (includes countries like: 
USA, Australia, Japan, New Zealand etc.). Both, Arnold et al. (2011) and Xing (2012), use these countries in 
their data sample. 
11 Previous empirical researches on OECD, uses countries with similar economic conditions. For example, Xing 
(2012) omits Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey from her data sample, which is reasonable, as it is 
necessary to control for outliers. But this also implies, that estimated results would apply only for countries with 
similar economic conditions. Thus we are unable to conclude how these estimates would correspond for 
countries with worse or better economic conditions. 
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3. Methods 
Analysis is based on constant-returns-to-scale technology, more specifically, on 
Solow model with augmented human capital and takes the form of Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
𝑌𝑡 =  𝐾𝑡
∝𝐻𝑡
𝛽
(𝐴𝑡𝐿𝑡)
1−∝−𝛽     (1) 
Where 𝑌 is output, 𝐾 – physical capital, 𝐻 – human capital, 𝐿 – labour, 𝐴 – level of 
technology. ∝ - partial elasticity of output with respect to physical capital, 𝛽 – partial 
elasticity of output with respect to human capital, 𝑡 – time period; Arnold et al. (2011)12. 
Further, author’s chosen econometric model is based on Arnold et al. (2011) where 
he uses error correction model (ECM), which allows to include independent variables in 
levels and first differences to show transition dynamics as well as lagged dependent variable 
in levels. Thus empirical model takes the following error correction form: 
∆ ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖,0  − 𝜙 (ln 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎1 ln 𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘 − 𝑎2 ln ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑎3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝑎𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=4
∗ 𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑗 ) 
(2) 
+𝛽1,𝑖∆ ln 𝑠𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 + 𝛽2,𝑖∆ ln ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖∆𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑖∆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=4
∗ ∆𝑉𝑖,𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
where 𝑦 is GDP per capita in purchasing power standards for country i  at year t; 𝑠𝑘 is 
physical capital; h is human capital, n is working population growth rate; T is total tax 
revenue to GDP ratio; V denotes a vector of tax classification in subcategories expressed as 
ratio from subcategory tax revenue to total tax revenue; 𝛾𝑖 is vector of coefficients;   
𝜙 is convergence parameter; t is function of time and 𝜀 is white noise error term. First line 
captures long-run linear equilibrium relation while second lined captures short-run dynamics. 
                                                 
12 Author will not present further calculations, as full formulation of the model is easily accessible in Arnold et 
al. (2007) 
14 
 
Author applies Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator to equation (2), proposed by 
Pesaran et al (1999). Pesaran (1999) introduced three estimators for analyzing dynamic panel 
models. Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimator – one of the extreme methods – assumes 
homogeneity, that all long-run and short-run coefficients and error variances across all 
countries are the same. Mean Group (ME) estimator – other extreme method – separately 
estimates long-run and short-run coefficients for each country and examines average 
distribution of country specific estimates. PMG estimator constraints the long-run 
coefficients to be identical but allows the short run coefficients and error variances to differ 
across countries. 
It is necessary to acknowledge the fact that author is analyzing tax structure, not their 
respective levels. With that in mind, there are significant differences between countries and 
their tax levels which, if not controlled, can cause spurious correlations. Thus tax levels are 
based on their revenue shares from total tax revenue.  
Further, Kneller et al. (1999)13 and Bleaney et al. (2001) argue about the role of 
government budget constraint (GBC) in interpretation of estimated results. As GBC has to 
be “respected”, this implies that changes in one instrument has to be balanced by changes 
(opposite) in other instrument so that GBC is not violated. Failing to account for this 
constraint will, likely, introduce estimation bias due to the linear relationship between fiscal 
variables and implicit financing assumption in regressions (Bleaney et al. 2001). 
For estimation purposes this implies that omitted variable automatically becomes 
compensating variable in GBC. Thus interpretation becomes in a form of “a unit change of 
fiscal variable compensated by a unit change in the fiscal element(s) omitted from 
regression” Kneller et al. (1999). 
In context of authors analysis, from regression omitted variable (tax category) will 
act as compensating variable (will be decreased) in order not to violate revenue neutrality. 
                                                 
13 Full theory and calculations accessible: Bleaney, Michael F., Norman Gemmell and Richard Kneller. 2001. 
Testing the endogenous growth model: public expenditure, taxation, and growth over the long run. 
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This gives possibility to evaluate different tax structure reforms as long as revenue neutrality 
is kept and correct interpretation is given. 
 
4. Data 
Author combines data from Eurostat and OECD databases. Author’s used dataset is 
longitudinal data on countries and year by year observations on general economic indicators 
and revenue statistics on taxes. The data set covers all 28 EU countries + 2 additional located 
in Europe (Norway and Switzerland) over the time period of 1995 – 2016. Detailed 
information on variable definitions and descriptive statistics is presented in Appendix B. 
To be able to observe and compare results between countries with different economic 
conditions, author divides dataset into two subsets. One subset consists EU1514 + 2 additional 
countries. Countries included in this subset are those who became EU member states before 
2004 - also in paper referred as “Old” EU countries. Other subset of EU1315 includes those 
countries who became EU member states after 2004 - also in paper referred as “New” EU 
countries. It is worth mentioning, that one can think of these country groups also as “high 
income” and “low income” as countries included in “New” EU country group have relatively 
lower income per capita than those in “Old” EU group.  
Appendix A Figure 1 illustrates average tax burden (total tax revenue) in % of GDP 
evolution over sample period between full data sample, old and new EU countries. Overall 
tax burden in EU countries remains relatively flat at 36% of GDP. The average tax burden as 
a share of GDP is highest in Denmark (around 47%) and lowest in Romania (around 26%). 
Figure demonstrates significant differences between old and new EU member states. Over 
sample period, tax burden in new EU member states has remained on average between 6-8 
percentage points lower than in old EU member states. Another difference between old and 
                                                 
14 EU15 countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
15 EU13 countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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new EU member states is effect of “crisis”16 on tax burden. Effect on old EU member states 
remains relatively low as total tax revenue as a share of GDP decreases by a small margin 
and lasts for two periods17. In new EU countries effect is more significant both in magnitude 
and time period. Starting from 2010 total tax revenue as a share of GDP has experienced 
steady increase and has reached highest point in old and new EU member states. 
Figure 2 and 3 illustrates tax structure by its main components as a percentage of total 
taxation in 1995 and 2016. Figure demonstrates significant differences in personal income 
taxes between old and new EU member states which remains in both 1995 and 2016. Personal 
income taxes are around 26% of total taxation for old EU member states and remains 
relatively flat comparing 1995 and 2016. For new EU member states, personal income taxes 
are around 17% in 1995 and 13.5% in 2016 of total taxation. For new EU member states 
figure illustrates slight increase in consumption taxes (from 39% to 43%) of total taxation 
between 1995 and 2016 while for old EU member states consumption taxes has remained at 
the same level (34% of total taxation). 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Benchmark results on EU28+2 
Appendix A Table 1 reports benchmark results of long-run coefficients of PMG 
estimates, omitted tax variable, mean convergence coefficient, observation count and log-
likelihood value. Based on Equation (2), ECM estimates also report short-run coefficients, 
but as author is interested only in long-term effects, short-run coefficients are not presented. 
Columns (1) to (5) report estimates of the base model and different tax structure 
combinations. It is worth mentioning that omitted tax variable represents the rest of the total 
                                                 
16 Global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
17 It is worth mentioning that decrease in total tax burden could have happened not only because of decrease in 
tax levels, but as well as increase in unemployment, drop in efficiency of State Tax department, increased 
“shadow economy” etc. 
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revenue share omitted from model, thus achieving revenue-neutrality18 which author 
discussed in Section 3. 
Mean convergence coefficient is in the range between 0.00 and -0.14 under different 
tax structure specifications. For Column (3) mean convergence coefficient is 0.00 and is 
statistically insignificant thus implying that estimated coefficients are highly imprecise (also 
shown by large standard errors) and should be interpreted with caution. As expected, long-
run coefficients on physical capital and human capital are positive and statistically 
significant, except in Column (4) where physical capital has a small negative coefficient. 
Overall, one percent increase in the share of physical capital would correspond to long-run 
increase in GDP per capita by 0.5-1%. Similarly, one percent increase in years spent on 
schooling correspond to 3.4-4.1% increase in long-run GDP per capita. Working population 
growth rate estimates are negative but are not always significant. One percentage point 
increase in working population growth rate would correspond to 0.03-0.16% decrease in 
long-run GDP per capita. Coefficients on tax burden in Column (1) and (5) are positive and 
significant at 10% level while in Column (2) and (4) they are negative and significant at 1% 
level. 
Column (1) reports that one percentage point increase in the share of Income Taxes 
& Social Security Contributions (IT&SSC), while decreasing share of Consumption Taxes 
(CT) by the same amount, would correspond to negative long-term effect on GDP per capita 
for about 0.6%. 
Column (2) separates between Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions 
(PIT&SSC) and Corporate Income Taxes (CIT). While both are negative, PIT&SSC is more 
distortive towards long-run level of income per capita than CIT (significant at 10% level). 
Column (3) estimates the effects of Consumption Taxes (CT) while omitting 
(IT&SSC). Increase in the share of CT corresponds to negative effects on long-run income 
                                                 
18 Included tax structure variables and omitted tax variable will always sum to 1 (100% of tax revenue). 
Statement is true for all tables included in this paper, where certain tax variables are omitted, unless stated 
otherwise. 
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per capita, but as stated before, due to insignificant mean convergence coefficient, estimated 
coefficients are highly imprecise.  
Column (4) separates between VAT Type Taxes (VAT), Other Consumption Taxes 
(OCT) and Property Taxes (PT). All have negative effects while only OCT and PT are 
significant. Estimated coefficient on OCT in its magnitude is reasonable (-5.43) while PT 
coefficient is highly questionable (-24.15). Especially, because in Column (5), where author 
separates between PT and Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)19, coefficient on PT is 
still significant but positive at much more reasonable magnitude (4.12). While combining 
VAT and OCT makes coefficient insignificant. 
 
5.2 Alternative combinations of Tax structure variables 
Table 2 reports results of long-run coefficients using same benchmark model while 
alternating different combinations of Tax structure variables. This allows to observe how all 
other tax structure variables will effect long-run income per capita when specific tax variable 
is omitted. This also allows to compare estimated coefficient magnitudes and significance 
levels with the ones from Table 1. 
Mean convergence coefficient is in the range between -0.06 and -0.15 under different 
tax structure specifications and in all cases is significant. As expected, estimated long-run 
coefficients on physical capital, human capital and working population growth rate are in line 
with those observed in Table 1. Estimated coefficients on tax burden remain inconclusive. In 
Table 2 Column (1) estimated coefficient on tax burden is positive while in others it is 
negative with significant changes in their magnitude.  
In Column (1) only CIT and VAT&OCT have positive significant effect on long-run 
income per capita while PIT&SSC is omitted. PT is negative and insignificant. 
In Column (2) PIT&SSC and VAT&OCT are both positive and significant while PT 
remains negative and insignificant when CIT is omitted. 
                                                 
19 VAT and OCT combined. Further in paper author uses abbreviation – VAT&OCT. 
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In Column (3) CIT and PT are both positive and significant while PIT&SSC becomes 
negative and insignificant when VAT&OCT is omitted. 
In Column (4) CIT and VAT&OCT are both positive and significant while PIT&SSC 
remains insignificant but positive when PT is omitted. 
 
5.3 Comparison with Arnold et al. (2011) 
Comparing author’s results with Arnold et al. (2011) estimated long-run coefficients 
it is possible to establish first conclusions about benchmark model. Physical capital and 
human capital estimated coefficients are in line with Arnold et al. (2011) findings but greater 
in their magnitudes. Coefficients on working population growth rate are very close. Authors 
estimated coefficients on tax burden are inconclusive in their sign and magnitude, oppose to 
Arnold et al. (2011) ~ -0.25.  
Author is unable to establish similar “tax distortion” ranking from benchmark model 
as Arnold et al. (2011) did. While author can be sure about negative effects of income taxes 
on long-run income per capita, it is impossible to “rank” them due to certain tax variable 
unreasonable magnitudes or low significance levels.  
It is import to acknowledge the main differences between Arnold et al. (2011) and 
author’s paper. Firstly, author uses data sample on EU28+2 countries for time period from 
1995-2016, oppose to 21 OECD countries for time period from 1970-2004. Secondly, author 
uses gross fixed capital formation (share of GDP) as a proxy for physical capital while Arnold 
et al. (2011) uses non-residential gross fixed capital formation (share of GDP). Thirdly, 
author uses slightly different approach calculating average years of schooling.  
To address these differences and inconclusive results, author proposes to use smaller 
data samples and add extra control variables to test robustness of benchmark model. In 
sections 6.1 and 6.2, author uses smaller samples divided in new and old EU countries 
respectively. In sections 6.3 and 6.4 author adds additional control variables to further test 
robustness on newly estimated models. 
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6. Robustness checks 
6.1 Results on EU13(New) 
Smaller data sample includes all countries who joined EU in 2004 and after. In Table 
3, for long-run coefficient estimation author uses same benchmark model setup and reports 
results in the same manner.  
Mean convergence coefficient is in the range between -0.05 and -0.11 under different 
tax structure specifications and are significant at 1% and 10% levels. For Column (4) mean 
convergence coefficient is -0.05 and is statistically insignificant thus, as previous, implying 
that estimated coefficients are imprecise and should be interpreted with caution. Physical 
capital long-run coefficients are positive and significant. One percent increase in the share of 
physical capital would correspond to increase in GDP per capita by 0.5-1.2% which is in line 
with the results from full sample. Human capital long-run coefficients are positive and 
significant, but the magnitudes are much higher than in full sample. One percent increase in 
average years spent on schooling correspond to 5.3-9.4% increase in GDP per capita. 
Working population growth rate is significant and would correspond for slight increase in 
income per capita. Long-run coefficients on tax burden are negative and significant. One 
percentage point increase in tax burden would correspond to -1.7% to -6.7% decrease in GDP 
per capita. 
Column (1) reports that one percentage point increase in the share of IT&SSC, while 
decreasing share of CT by the same amount, would correspond to negative long-term effect 
on GDP per capita for about 0.84%. 
In converse, Column (3) reports slightly higher positive effect of CT on long-run 
income per capita when IT&SSC is omitted. 
Column (2) reports that both PIT&SSC and CIT are negative and significant while 
PIT&SSC are more distortive towards long-run income per capita. 
Column (4) shows that both VAT and OCT are significant while VAT has positive 
effect and OCT has higher negative effect on long-run income per capita. Due to insignificant 
mean convergence coefficient estimated coefficients are imprecise but are somehow 
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consistent with coefficients estimated in Column (5). VAT&OCT remains significant and 
positive while PT remains insignificant in both Column (4) and (5).  
 
6.2 Results on EU15+2(Old) 
Table 4 reports benchmark results of long-run coefficients for data sample consisting 
of countries who joined EU before 2004. Mean convergence coefficient is in the range 
between -0.18 and -0.20 under different tax structure specifications and are significant at 1% 
level. Physical capital and human capital have expected signs and are significant. Overall, 
one percent increase in the share of physical capital would correspond to increase in GDP 
per capita by 0.3-0.7%. Similarly, one percent increase in years spent on schooling 
correspond to 3.8-4.4% increase in GDP per capita. Working population growth rate is 
significant and would correspond for slight decrease in income per capita. Long-run 
coefficients of tax burden are significant and positive, except Column (2) – negative and 
insignificant. One percentage point increase in tax burden would correspond to 0.8-0.9% 
increase in GDP per capita. 
Column (1) reports that one percentage point increase in the share of IT&SSC, while 
decreasing share of CT by the same amount, would correspond to negative long-term effect 
on GDP per capita for 0.57%. 
In converse, Column (3) reports slightly higher positive effect of CT on long-run 
income per capita when IT&SSC is omitted. 
Column (2) reports that both PIT&SSC and CIT are significant. While PIT&SSC is, 
unsurprisingly, negative, CIT has higher positive effect on long-run income per capita than 
CT. 
Column (4) and Column (5) reports positive and significant effect of PT on long-run 
income per capita. While VAT and OCT are independently significant and have expected 
signs in Column (4), in Column (5) combination of two becomes insignificant. 
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6.3 Results on EU13(New) with additional control variables 
Similarly, as in Arnold et al. (2011), author will include in the model additional 
control variables, as there are other variables which correspond behind driving forces of GDP 
per capita growth. Arnold et al. (2011) uses inflation, inflation volatility, trade openness and 
research and development (R&D) to test robustness of benchmark model. Author will use 
same control variables to test robustness of the split dataset models, discussed in previous 
two subsections. It is worth mentioning, that PMG estimator runs a complex non-linear 
maximum likelihood algorithm thus there are only certain number of independent variables 
one can include in regression. Large number of independent variables may cause endless 
iterations thus algorithm will not converge. As a result, author could use only two out of four 
additional variables – trade openness and R&D. Also, for the same reason, Table 5 and Table 
6 report only four columns as models with VAT, OCT and PT did not converge. 
In Table 5, mean convergence coefficient is in the range between -0.07 and -0.09 
under different tax structure specifications and are significant at 1% level. Physical capital 
remains significant and positive with slight increase in magnitude. Human capital and 
working population growth rate remains significant only in Column (2). Tax burden remains 
negative and significant in its long-run effects on income per capita with significant increase 
in its magnitude (7.4-8.2%). Trade openness has significant and positive effect, except 
Column (2) – negative effect. Overall, one percent increase in the share of trade openness 
would correspond to 0.7-0.9% increase in income per capita. R&D long-run effects are 
minimal in their magnitude and insignificant.  
All tax variables remain their significance levels as in Table 3. While coefficient 
magnitudes increase, general ranking remains. IT&SSC and CT have opposite effects on 
long-run income per capita with almost identical magnitudes. PIT&SSC remains most 
“distortive” while VAT&OCT remains positive and significant. PT remains insignificant. 
Only surprising result is that CIT corresponds to positive long-run effect on income per capita 
when additional control variables are included as oppose to negative effect observed in Table 
3. 
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6.4 Results on EU15+2(Old) with additional control variables 
In Table 6, mean convergence coefficient is in the range between -0.11 and -0.15 
under different tax structure specifications and are significant at 1% level. Physical capital 
remains significant and positive with slight decrease in magnitude. Human capital remains 
positive and significant in its long-run effects on income per capita with significant decrease 
in its magnitude (0.9-3.1%). Working population growth rate and tax burden become 
insignificant. Increase in the share of trade openness has a slightly lower effect on long-run 
income per capita than that observed in new EU countries (0.4-0.8%). R&D is significant in 
Column (2) and (4) and present low negative effect.  
All tax variables remain their significance levels as in Table 4. Similarly, as in 
previous subsection, addition of extra control variables, change coefficient magnitudes but 
not their “ranking”. IT&SSC and CT (significant at 10% level) have opposite effects on long-
run income per capita with almost identical magnitudes. PIT&SSC remains most “distortive” 
while CIT remains with significant positive effect on long-run income per capita. PT remains 
least “distortive” while VAT&OCT remains insignificant. 
 
Summary  
In this section, author tests robustness of benchmark model by estimating long-run 
coefficients on two subsets – new and old EU countries, and by adding additional control 
variables. Estimated models show more conclusive and robust results compared to 
benchmark model. While no “distortion” ranking can be established in benchmark model, 
broad conclusions on ranking and comparison to Arnold et al. (2011) results can be made 
when using split subsets. 
In both, old and new EU countries, PIT&SSC are most “distortive” towards long-run 
GDP per capita. PT are least “distortive” only in old EU countries while in new EU countries 
estimated coefficients on PT are insignificant. In new EU countries least “distortive” are 
VAT&OCT while in old EU countries these taxes are insignificant. As oppose to Arnold et 
al. (2011) results, CIT are not “most” distortive and suggest positive, significant and robust 
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long-term effect on income per capita in old EU countries. In new EU countries, CIT 
estimated effects are significant but not robust and changes sign when additional control 
variables are included. 
 
7. Validity of identical constraints in the long-run coefficients 
So far, author has only observed the results from PMG estimations which constraints 
the long-run coefficients to be homogenous but allows the short run coefficients and error 
variances to differ across groups. To be able to prove validity of constraint, it is necessary to 
test estimation results against model with different parametric assumptions.  Author chooses 
unweighted Mean Group (ME) estimator which separately estimates long-run and short-run 
coefficients for each group and examines average distribution of group specific estimates. To 
compare PMG estimates and unweighted MG estimates, author uses Hausman test20. 
Table 7 reports PMG and unweighted MG estimates, standard errors and significance 
levels on benchmark model using full dataset. Last row in table reports Hausman joint test 
statistic and p-value. From table, it can be seen that MG estimates are statistically 
insignificant and with large standard errors thus, already, establishing why to use PMG over 
MG estimates. Hausman test statistic in second column χ2(5) = 2.51 with Prob > χ2 = 0.77 
suggest that author cannot reject H0 and joint long-run coefficients are homogenous across 
groups. Same applies for all other estimated models from full dataset, except column 4 where 
Hausman test statistic is negative. 
Table 8 and Table 9 reports results for EU13(New) and EU15+2(Old) accordingly. 
In all models in both tables, author cannot reject H0 thus suggesting that joint long-run 
coefficients are homogenous across groups and PMG estimator is consistent and efficient. 
 
                                                 
20 H0: long-run coefficients are homogenous across groups; H1: long-run coefficients are heterogenous;  
Under H0 both, MG and PMG, are consistent, while PMG is more efficient; Under H1 only MG is consistent. 
Author uses Stata command: hausman MG PMG, sigmamore; sigmamore -  specifies that the covariance 
matrices be based on the estimated disturbance variance from the efficient estimator. (Stata Journal Vol. 7) 
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8. Conclusions 
The primary aim of this paper is to examine revenue-neutral tax structure effect on 
long-run economic growth using panel data growth regression for 30 countries located in 
Europe (EU, Norway and Switzerland) over time period of 1995 - 2016. Secondary aim is to 
compare results with Arnold et al. (2011) achieved results where author established certain 
ranking on tax structure “distortion” on economic growth. Tertiary aim is to test coefficient 
robustness and validity when benchmark models are applied to smaller subset of countries, 
divided between new and old EU countries. Author uses Pooled Mean Group estimator which 
constraints the long-run coefficients to be identical but allows the short run coefficients and 
error variances to differ across countries. 
Benchmark model estimation results on all 30 countries are only partially in line with 
Arnold et al. (2011). While estimated parameter signs and significance levels are almost 
identical to the ones found in Arnold et al. (2011), for some parameters, magnitudes are 
slightly higher. Furthermore, author is unable to establish similar “tax distortion” ranking 
from benchmark model as Arnold et al. (2011) did. While estimation results support positive 
long-run effect on income per capita when shift in total tax revenue is away from income 
taxes, no further “ranking” can be established due to certain tax structure variable parameter 
unreasonable magnitudes or low significance levels. 
When benchmark model is applied to smaller subsets, estimation results on tax 
structure effect on long-run income per capita become more conclusive. Personal Income 
Taxes & Social Security Contributions are most “distortive” towards long-run income per 
capita in both, old and new EU countries. Similarly, as Arnold et al. (2011) reported, property 
taxes are least “distortive” and shift in total tax revenue towards these taxes could be 
associated with positive effect on long-run income per capita. Although, this is only true for 
old EU countries while for new EU countries estimated parameters on property taxes are 
insignificant. In new EU countries, least “distortive” are other consumption taxes (excl. 
property taxes) while, contrary, in old EU countries estimated results on these taxes are 
insignificant. Oppose to Arnold et al. (2011) results, corporate income taxes are not “most” 
distortive and have a positive long-run effect on income per capita in old EU countries. In 
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new EU countries corporate income tax is significant but not robust with its long-run effect. 
Conclusions about other tax structure long-run effects are robust when estimated models are 
tested with extra variables.  Furthermore, Hausman test suggests that chosen PMG estimator 
is consistent and efficient.  
Analysis suggest that, while certain tax structure “ranking” can be established in a 
group of countries with similar economic conditions, there are some tax structure variables 
that could change in their magnitude and even in its effect between these groups. This further 
suggest that one has to be cautious with policy recommendations on revenue-neutral tax 
structure changes for individual countries. 
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Appendix A: Figures and tables 
Figure 1: Tax burden (total tax revenue) as a share of GDP in percent. 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations 
Figure 2: Tax structure by its main components as a percentage of total taxation in 1995. 
Note: CT - Consumption Taxes; PIT – Personal Income Taxes; SSC – Social Security Contributions; CIT - 
Corporate Income Taxes; PT - Property Taxes. 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations 
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Figure 3: Tax structure by its main components as a percentage of total taxation in 2016. 
Note: CT - Consumption Taxes; PIT – Personal Income Taxes; SSC – Social Security Contributions; CIT - 
Corporate Income Taxes; PT - Property Taxes. 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations 
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Table 1 
Estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita. Full dataset. 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline model                    
Physical Capital 0.51*** 1.03*** -5.84** -0.14*** 0.72*** 
 (0.04) (0.14) (2.91) (0.04) (0.04) 
        
Human Capital 3.96*** 3.38*** -6.19 3.87*** 4.13*** 
 (0.18) (0.57) (6.99) (0.31) (0.14) 
        
Population Growth -0.03*** -0.16*** 0.56* 0.00 -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control variable        
Tax Burden 0.66* -4.01*** 55.88* -4.62*** 0.53*   
 (0.37) (0.71) (29.48) (0.69) (0.31) 
Tax structure variables        
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions -0.61***                  
 (0.21)                  
        
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   -5.13***                 
   (0.76)                 
        
Corporate Income Taxes   -1.43*                 
   (0.85)                 
        
Consumption Taxes    -15.70*               
    (8.96)               
        
VAT Type Taxes      -0.17              
      (0.35)              
        
Other Consumption Taxes      -5.43***              
      (0.46)              
        
Property Taxes      -24.15*** 4.12*** 
      (2.20) (0.96) 
        
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)       -0.07 
       (0.21) 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & Social Security 
Contributions 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.14*** -0.08*** 0.00 -0.11*** -0.14*** 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 623 623 623 577 581 
Log likelihood 1489.36 1572.56 1447.5 1429.23 1421.85 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All equations 
include short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
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Table 2 
Additional estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita. Full dataset. 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline model                    
Physical Capital 0.19** 1.01*** 0.52*** 0.65*** 
 (0.08) (0.17) (0.04) (0.12) 
         
Human Capital 4.52*** 3.56*** 4.43*** 4.38*** 
 (0.40) (0.77) (0.12) (0.49) 
         
Population Growth 0.05*** -0.11*** -0.03*** -0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Control variable         
Tax Burden 1.35** -5.32*** -0.65** -3.39*** 
 (0.60) (1.20) (0.28) (0.57) 
Tax structure variables         
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   3.86** -0.20 1.14 
   (1.57) (0.15) (2.25) 
         
Corporate Income Taxes 3.49***   1.57*** 5.22**  
 (0.53)   (0.33) (2.14) 
         
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes) 4.02*** 11.75***   4.68**  
 (0.58) (2.00)   (2.17) 
         
Property Taxes -1.71 -5.38 3.75***              
 (1.70) (5.73) (0.95)              
Omitted tax variable 
Private Income 
Taxes & Social 
Security 
Contributions 
Corporate 
Income 
Taxes 
Consumption 
Taxes (excl. 
Property 
Taxes) 
Property 
Taxes 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.07** -0.06*** -0.15*** -0.09*** 
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
N 581 581 581 623 
Log likelihood 1463.29 1469.3 1496.23 1606.69 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All equations include 
short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
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Table 3 
Estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita. EU13(New). 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline model                    
Physical Capital 0.47*** 1.22*** 0.50*** -0.41*** 0.49*** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.14) (0.09) 
        
Human Capital 9.15*** 5.34*** 9.26*** 1.53 9.38*** 
 (0.44) (1.35) (0.46) (0.99) (0.55) 
        
Population Growth 0.03** -0.09** 0.03** 0.09*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Control variable        
Tax Burden -1.95*** -6.69*** -2.09*** -6.53*** -1.70*** 
 (0.45) (1.47) (0.45) (1.17) (0.56) 
Tax structure variables        
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions -0.84***                  
 (0.32)                  
        
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   -4.84***                 
   (1.30)                 
        
Corporate Income Taxes   -3.18***                 
   (1.23)                 
        
Consumption Taxes    0.95***               
    (0.36)               
        
VAT Type Taxes      5.16***              
      (1.25)              
        
Other Consumption Taxes      -8.98***              
      (1.29)              
        
Property Taxes      1.18 -1.95 
      (3.79) (2.52) 
        
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)       1.18*** 
       (0.42) 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & Social Security 
Contributions 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.09* -0.08*** -0.09* -0.05 -0.11*   
(0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Observations 266 266 266 241 245 
Log likelihood 619.66 662.96 619.12 600.97 582.84 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All equations 
include short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
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Table 4 
Estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita. EU15+2(Old). 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline model                    
Physical Capital 0.53*** 0.34*** 0.50*** 0.72*** 0.71*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
        
Human Capital 3.99*** 4.38*** 3.85*** 4.00*** 4.13*** 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) 
        
Population Growth -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control variable        
Tax Burden 0.93** -0.40 0.79* 0.92*** 0.73**  
 (0.39) (0.30) (0.41) (0.29) (0.32) 
Tax structure variables        
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions -0.57***                  
 (0.22)                  
        
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   -1.21***                 
   (0.17)                 
        
Corporate Income Taxes   0.88***                 
   (0.28)                 
        
Consumption Taxes    0.61***               
    (0.21)               
        
VAT Type Taxes      0.91**              
      (0.40)              
        
Other Consumption Taxes      -0.56**              
      (0.26)              
        
Property Taxes      3.83*** 4.15*** 
      (0.98) (1.08) 
        
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)       -0.12 
       (0.22) 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & Social Security 
Contributions 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.19*** -0.20*** -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.19*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) 
Observations 357 357 357 336 336 
Log likelihood 884.58 937.2 884.12 872.94 858.58 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All equations 
include short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
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Table 5 
Estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita with additional control 
variables. EU13(New). 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline model                   
Physical Capital 1.57*** 1.14*** 1.60*** 1.40*** 
 (0.25) (0.08) (0.26) (0.24) 
       
Human Capital -0.54 6.09*** -0.77 0.87 
 (2.93) (1.28) (2.97) (2.65) 
       
Population Growth 0.04 -0.03** 0.03 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
Control variable       
Tax Burden -7.39*** -8.21*** -7.36*** -7.41*** 
 (1.56) (0.71) (1.58) (1.49) 
       
Trade Openness 0.94*** -0.51*** 0.95*** 0.71*** 
 (0.31) (0.14) (0.31) (0.28) 
       
Research & Development 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
Tax structure variables       
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions -3.23***                 
 (0.95)                 
       
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   -9.91***                
   (1.00)                
       
Corporate Income Taxes   1.11**                
   (0.55)                
       
Consumption Taxes    3.36***              
    (0.97)              
       
Property Taxes      4.62 
      (7.10) 
       
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)      2.84*** 
      (1.04) 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.07*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.08*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 266 266 266 245 
Log likelihood 692.36 745.03 693.2 649.63 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All 
equations include short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
 
 
38 
 
Table 6 
Estimation results of tax structure effects on long-run GDP per capita with additional control 
variables. EU15+2(Old). 
Dependent variable: Log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Baseline model                   
Physical Capital 0.40*** 0.16*** 0.39*** 0.47*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) 
       
Human Capital 1.25*** 3.14*** 0.91* 1.97*** 
 (0.44) (0.25) (0.48) (0.48) 
       
Population Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02*   
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control variable       
Tax Burden 0.60 -0.68*** 0.61 0.94 
 (0.43) (0.26) (0.48) (0.59) 
       
Trade Openness 0.70*** 0.42*** 0.72*** 0.80*** 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) 
       
Research & Development 0.04 -0.09** 0.08 -0.40*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.09) 
Tax structure variables       
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions -0.38**                 
 (0.17)                 
       
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions   -1.49***                
   (0.14)                
       
Corporate Income Taxes   1.69***                
   (0.29)                
       
Consumption Taxes    0.35*              
    (0.19)              
       
Property Taxes      3.82*** 
      (1.37) 
       
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes)      -0.19 
      (0.30) 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & 
Social Security 
Contributions 
Mean convergence coefficient 
-0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.11*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Observations 336 336 336 315 
Log likelihood 941.78 978.04 937.23 892.63 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. All 
equations include short-run dynamics, but only long-run estimation coefficients are presented. 
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Table 7 
Hausman test of homogeneity restriction on the long-run coefficients. Full dataset. 
LR coefficients MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG 
Physical Capital 0.49 0.51*** -1.54 1.03*** 0.66 -5.84** 0.61 -0.14*** 0.16 0.72*** 
  (0.80) (0.04) (1.56) (0.14) (0.96) (2.91) (0.77) (0.04) (0.65) (0.04) 
Human Capital 62.20 3.96*** 0.89 3.38*** 40.59 -6.19 4.31 3.87*** 4.67 4.13*** 
  (55.54) (0.18) (9.45) (0.57) (34.38) (6.99) (5.94) (0.31) (5.83) (0.14) 
Pop. growth -0.22 -0.03*** -0.09 -0.16*** 0.22 0.56* 0.17 0.00 0.11 -0.04*** 
  (0.24) (0.01) (0.20) (0.03) (0.25) (0.31) (0.21) (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) 
Tax Burden 8.16 0.66* -1.20 -4.01*** 5.60 55.88* 1.03 -4.62*** 1.28 0.53*   
  (9.78) (0.37) (5.37) (0.71) (6.59) (29.48) (3.87) (0.69) (3.93) (0.31) 
IT & SSC 27.41 -0.61***              
  (32.13) (0.21)              
PIT & SSC    -4.08 -5.13***           
     (4.71) (0.76)           
CIT    12.43 -1.43*           
     (8.88) (0.85)           
CT       -13.85 -15.70*        
        (19.89) (8.96)        
VAT          3.17 -0.17     
           (2.36) (0.35)     
OCT          -0.70 -5.43***     
           (3.16) (0.46)     
PT          -5.53 -24.15*** -7.42 4.12*** 
           (14.99) (2.20) (15.19) (0.96) 
VATOCT             -1.33 -0.07 
              (2.24) (0.21) 
Hausman test 
(MG vs PMG) 
χ2(5) = 2.51 χ2(6) = 1.44 χ2(5) = -6.20 χ2(7) = 1.89 χ2(6) = 0.77 
Prob > χ2 = 0.77 Prob > χ2 = 0.96 Prob > χ2 = 0 Prob > χ2 = 0.97 Prob > χ2 = 0.99 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. 
IT & SSC - Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
PIT & SSC - Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
CIT - Corporate Income Taxes; 
CT - Consumption Taxes; 
VAT - VAT Type Taxes; 
OCT - Other Consumption taxes; 
PT - Property Taxes; 
VATOCT - Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes). 
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Table 8 
Hausman test of homogeneity restriction on the long-run coefficients. EU13(New). 
LR coefficients MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG 
Physical Capital 2.11* 0.47*** -1.89 1.22*** 2.49 0.50*** 0.31 -0.41*** -0.18 0.49*** 
  (1.10) (0.08) (3.00) (0.15) (1.58) (0.09) (1.67) (0.14) (1.51) (0.09) 
Human Capital 140.23 9.15*** 1.69 5.34*** 90.8 9.26*** 4.25 1.53 4.56 9.38*** 
  (127.65) (0.44) (21.88) (1.35) (78.81) (0.46) (13.59) (0.99) (12.74) (0.55) 
Pop. growth 0.70 0.03** -0.42 -0.09** 0.71 0.03** 0.48 0.09*** 0.32 0.05*** 
  (0.52) (0.01) (0.37) (0.04) (0.54) (0.01) (0.44) (0.02) (0.33) (0.02) 
Tax Burden 20.35 -1.95*** -14.33* -6.69*** 14.18 -2.09*** 5.58 -6.53*** 4.42 -1.70*** 
  (22.06) (0.45) (7.77) (1.47) (14.53) (0.45) (8.01) (1.17) (8.90) (0.56) 
IT & SSC 70.15 -0.84***         
  (74.01) (0.32)         
PIT & SSC   -1.39 -4.84***       
    (9.21) (1.30)       
CIT   24.34 -3.18***       
    (16.38) (1.23)       
CT     -39.05 0.95***     
      (45.84) (0.36)     
VAT       0.83 5.16***   
        (4.49) (1.25)   
OCT       -1.85 -8.98***   
        (6.13) (1.29)   
PT       12.77 1.18 1.02 -1.95 
        (30.55) (3.79) (30.51) (2.52) 
VATOCT         -2.63 1.18*** 
          (4.67) (0.42) 
Hausman test 
(MG vs PMG) 
χ2(5) = 1.38 χ2(5) = 5.95 χ2(5) = 1.35 χ2(5) = 8.71 χ2(5) = 0.71 
Prob > χ2 = 0.93 Prob > χ2 = 0.43 Prob > χ2 = 0.93 Prob > χ2 = 0.27 Prob > χ2 = 0.99 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. 
IT & SSC - Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
PIT & SSC - Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
CIT - Corporate Income Taxes; 
CT - Consumption Taxes; 
VAT - VAT Type Taxes; 
OCT - Other Consumption taxes; 
PT - Property Taxes; 
VATOCT - Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes). 
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Table 9 
Hausman test of homogeneity restriction on the long-run coefficients. EU15+2(Old) 
LR coefficients MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG MG PMG 
Physical Capital -0.74 0.53*** -1.28 0.34*** -0.74 0.50*** 0.84 0.72*** 0.43 0.71*** 
  (1.08) (0.04) (1.62) (0.04) (1.11) (0.05) (0.59) (0.04) (0.29) (0.04) 
Human Capital 2.53 3.99*** 0.28 4.38*** 2.20 3.85*** 4.35 4.00*** 4.75 4.13*** 
  (2.48) (0.18) (3.31) (0.12) (2.25) (0.19) (3.11) (0.16) (4.22) (0.15) 
Pop. growth -0.14 -0.04*** 0.17 -0.03*** -0.15 -0.03*** -0.06 -0.04*** -0.04 -0.04*** 
  (0.09) (0.01) (0.21) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.18) (0.01) 
Tax Burden -1.17 0.93** 8.85 -0.40 -0.96 0.79* -2.38 0.92*** -1.07 0.73**  
  (3.76) (0.39) (6.57) (0.30) (3.41) (0.41) (3.18) (0.29) (2.08) (0.32) 
IT & SSC -5.28** -0.57***                         
  (2.27) (0.22)                         
PIT & SSC    -6.14 -1.21***                      
     (4.65) (0.17)                      
CIT    3.32 0.88***                      
     (9.29) (0.28)                      
CT       5.41** 0.61***                   
        (2.51) (0.21)                   
VAT          4.93** 0.91**                
           (2.43) (0.40)                
OCT          0.17 -0.56**                
           (3.28) (0.26)                
PT          -19.25 3.83*** -13.76 4.15*** 
           (12.84) (0.98) (14.43) (1.08) 
VATOCT             -0.35 -0.12 
              (1.92) (0.22) 
Hausman test 
(MG vs PMG) 
χ2(5) = 4.12 χ2(5) = 0.59 χ2(5) = 5.85 χ2(5) = 0.94 χ2(5) = 1.49 
Prob > χ2 = 0.53 Prob > χ2 = 0.99 Prob > χ2 = 0.32 Prob > χ2 = 0.99 Prob > χ2 = 0.96 
Note: *: significant at 10% level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1% level. Standard errors are in brackets. 
IT & SSC - Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
PIT & SSC - Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions; 
CIT - Corporate Income Taxes; 
CT - Consumption Taxes; 
VAT - VAT Type Taxes; 
OCT - Other Consumption taxes; 
PT - Property Taxes; 
VATOCT - Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes). 
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Appendix B: Descriptive statistics, definitions and data sources 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Country ID 660 15.50 8.66 1 30 
Year 660 2005.50 6.35 1995 2016 
Log GDP per capita 660 9.915 0.526 8.434 11.257 
Log Physical Capital 660 3.090 0.186 1.686 3.622 
Log Human Capital 653 2.472 0.059 2.262 2.567 
Working Population Growth Rate 653 0.216 0.947 -3.585 3.738 
Log Trade Openness 660 4.564 0.464 3.614 6.017 
Expenditure on Research & Development 637 1.406 0.861 0.150 3.910 
Tax Burden 653 0.360 0.061 0.236 0.497 
Tax Categories      
Consumption Taxes 653 0.372 0.068 0.215 0.561 
Property Taxes 609 0.017 0.013 0.000 0.062 
VAT type taxes 649 0.204 0.046 0.112 0.349 
Other Consumption taxes 653 0.153 0.046 0.081 0.409 
Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes) 653 0.356 0.068 0.212 0.556 
Corporate Income Taxes 653 0.085 0.043 0.013 0.293 
Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions 653 0.521 0.071 0.327 0.679 
Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions 653 0.626 0.068 0.425 0.784 
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Definitions of variables used in regressions: 
 Log GDP per capita (ln_y): Gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power 
standards. (EUROSTAT National Accounts); 
 Log Physical Capital (ln_sk): Total gross fixed capital formation, as a share of gross 
domestic product GDP. (EUROSTAT National Accounts); 
 Log Human Capital (ln_h): proxied by the average years of schooling of the 
population from 25 to 64 years of age. (EUROSTAT Education and Training). 
Calculated using formula: 
 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 =  Ι𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 9 + ΙΙ𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 12 + ΙΙΙ𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 15 
 
Where: 
 Ι𝑖,𝑡 – share of population attained less than primary, primary and lower secondary 
education (ISCED1121 levels 0-2); 
 ΙΙ𝑖,𝑡 - share of population attained upper secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary education (ISCED11 levels 3 and 4); 
 ΙΙΙ𝑖,𝑡 - share of population attained tertiary education (ISCED11 levels 5-8); 
 9;12;1522 represent average years of schooling in each category accordingly. 
 Working Population Growth Rate (n): annual growth rate of population aged 15-64 
years in percent. (EUROSTAT Population and Social Conditions); 
 Tax Burden: total tax revenue as a ratio of GDP. (EUROSTAT Government 
Statistics); 
 Log Trade Openness: sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP in percent. 
(EUROSTAT National Accounts); 
 Expenditure on Research & Development: gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
share of GDP in percent. (EUROSTAT Government Statistics); 
                                                 
21 International Standard Classification of Education 2011 
22 ISCED 1+2 typical cumulative duration is 9 years; ISCED 3+4 typical cumulative duration is 12 years; 
ISCED 5 on average is additional 3 years of schooling. As ISCED 5 to ISCED 8 is additional 2-10 years, author 
assumed minimal years of schooling necessary to obtain tertiary education (15). 
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Tax indicators expressed as respective tax category revenue as a ratio of total tax revenue. 
Tax categories are based on EUROSTAT tax classification (reference in brackets). 
(EUROSTAT Government Statistics); 
 Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions: Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 
(D5) and Net social contributions (D61); 
 Private Income Taxes & Social Security Contributions: Taxes on individual or 
household income including holding gains (D51A_C1) and Net social contributions 
(D61); 
 Corporate Income Taxes: Taxes on the income or profits of corporations including 
holding gains (D51B_C2); 
 Consumption Taxes: Taxes on production and imports (D2); 
 VAT Type Taxes: Value added type taxes (D211); 
 Other Consumption taxes: Other taxes on production (excl. Property Taxes) (D29 
excl. D29A); 
 Property Taxes: Taxes on land, buildings and other structures (D29A); 
 Consumption Taxes (excl. Property Taxes): Taxes on production and imports (excl. 
Property Taxes) (D2 excl. D29A) 
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Appendix C: Estimation results from Arnold et al. (2011) 
Estimated Cross-country Effects of the Tax Mix on Long-run GDP per Capita from Arnold 
et al. (2011) 
Source: Arnold, Jens, Bert Brys, Christopher Heady, Asa Johansson, Cyrille Schwellnus and Laura Vartia. 
2011. Tax policy for economic recovery and growth. The Economic Journal 121: 59-80. 
 
Dependent variable: log GDP p.c. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline model                    
Physical Capital 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.21*** 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.45) 
        
Human Capital 1.19*** 1.30*** 1.18*** 1.40*** 1.57*** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) 
        
Population Growth -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Control variable        
Overall tax burden (Total revenues/GDP) -0.27*** -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.14***   
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Tax structure variables        
Income taxes -0.98***                  
 (0.20)                  
        
Personal income taxes   -1.13***                 
   (0.19)                 
        
Corporate income taxes   -2.01***                 
   (0.32)                 
        
Consumption and property taxes    0.93***               
    (0.20)               
        
Consumption taxes (excl. property taxes)      0.74***   0.72***           
      (0.18) (0.19)             
        
Property taxes      1.45***              
      (0.43)              
        
Property Taxes: recurrent taxes on immovable property       2.47*** 
       (0.84) 
        
Property Taxes: other property taxes       -0.34 
       (0.51) 
Observations 696 675 696 696 698 
Omitted tax variable Consumption Taxes 
Income Taxes & Social Security 
Contributions 
Notes. * Significant at 10 % level; ** at 5% level; *** at 1 % level. All equations include short-run dynamics, country-
specific intercepts and country-specific time controls. Standard errors are in brackets. 
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